Over 50 years ago, data from the patient H.M. (Scoville & Milner, 1957) helped establish a framework for thinking about the organization of memory. Central to this framework is the assertion that memories are only initially dependent on the hippocampal formation, becoming independent of this brain region once memory consolidation has been completed. Until recently, most theories of the cognitive neuroscience of memory have taken this assumption, central to the so-called standard model of memory consolidation, as a given. A well-known example of this position is complementary learning systems theory (e.g., McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995; Norman, 2010) , which starts with the generally accepted premise that the hippocampus and neocortex work by different computational principles, and argues that the same information, in detail, can be represented in both systems, one at early stages and the other at later stages of memory formation.
However, current evidence challenges the core assumption of the standard model that the hippocampus plays only a temporary role in memory, demonstrating that the hippocampal formation is engaged in retrieving even quite old episodic memories. Evidence from studies in humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; e.g., Ryan et al., 2001) as well as in rats using optogenetic methods to selectively disrupt function in particular hippocampal networks (Goshen et al., 2011) shows that the hippocampus is actively engaged in the retrieval of quite old memories, especially those that are highly salient and hence vividly remembered (cf. Gilboa, Winocur, Grady, Hevenor, & Moscovitch, 2004; Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009 ). Finally, impairments in retrieving detailed remote and recent memories were observed in 12 amnesics with damage confined to the hippocampus proper, as confirmed with highresolution imaging (Miller et al., 2013) . The "multiple trace theory" (e.g., Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997) , proposed as an alternative to the standard model of memory consolidation, takes as its core assumption that the hippocampus plays an ongoing role in episodic memory, possibly through its central engagement in representing the contexts that are essential to such memories.
These considerations about memory have generally not taken issue with the textbook view that there is a sharp boundary between brain systems important to memory and those central to other cognitive functions. For example, the standard model of memory consolidation assumes that the medial temporal lobe (MTL) is a dedicated long-term memory system (cf. Squire, 2004) , playing no role in such things as working memory, attention, and perception. Recently, a number of investigators have argued that this approach might be misguided and have suggested instead that we should think about these regions of the brain as being organized in terms of a hierarchy of representations (Barense, Ngo, Hung, & Peterson, 2012; Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida, 2010; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Nadel & Hardt, 2011) , each of which codes for a different kind of information. Any function requiring a particular kind of information will engage the relevant representational level. This way of conceptualizing brain system organization stands in stark opposition to the 50-year-old framework about memory, and the roles it assigns to the hippocampus and its neighbors in the MTL. Nadel and Hardt (2011) reviewed the evidence showing that the hippocampus plays an important role in many cognitive functions beyond traditional "memory," even if this role is simply to provide access to relevant experience from the past in solving some current or future problem. As Aggleton (2012) has recently pointed out, the hippocampus is a component of multiple networks, thereby providing its input to a wide array of cognitive processes. Our focus in this article is largely on the network Aggleton, labeled the reciprocal hippocampal-parahippocampal system. This network encompasses the MTL neighbors of the hippocampus and is to be distinguished from another network that includes a variety of midline structures, such as the mammillary bodies, retrosplenial cortex, and anterior thalamic nuclei, which Aggleton labels the extended hippocampal system for episodic memory. We think it is worth going beyond the MTL structures discussed by Aggleton. Looked at from another angle, the hippocampus is assumed to lie at the top of a hierarchy described in the classic Felleman and Van Essen (1991) wiring diagram that starts with primary sensory cortices. We call this hierarchy that ranges from the sensory cortices to the hippocampus the Posterior Representational Network (PRN), similar to the terminology used by Fuster (2008) . In our view, the brain regions in this network can be said to represent the structure of the environments and experiences the organism has been exposed to. Regularities in space and time help to define objects and events, their form and function, and the situations in which they were encountered. Neural representations of this knowledge underpin what we otherwise call memory, either semantic or episodic. The fact that the hippocampus lies at one extreme of this hierarchy suggests that it is representing something quite complex, which comports with its widely accepted role in cognitive map formation (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) . Some have argued that it also fits with the notion of the hippocampus as an all-purpose "relational memory" device (e.g., Eichenbaum, Otto, & Cohen, 1994) , or as a temporal context system central to episodic memory (Eichenbaum, 2013) . We do not rehash the finer points of this debate here, nor do we discuss at any length the hippocampal role in such things as sequence learning, time, and transitive inference. The notion of a "cognitive map," as articulated by O'Keefe and Nadel, encompasses both the spatial maps they focused on and the temporal maps that others have viewed as incompatible with their approach. In both cases, a spatial scaffolding system provides the basis for representations that are either a slice through time (static spatial maps) or a slice through space (dynamic spatial maps portraying the set of states associated with that space over time, i.e., an episode). Our focus is on this representational role of the hippocampus; addressing how this function involves the hippocampus in supposedly nonspatial tasks will have to come later.
We agree with O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) that the hippocampal role in representing spatial layouts means that it is critical for learning about contexts. This is one reason why the hippocampus is essential for episodic memory, because episode boundaries are largely defined by changes in context (e.g., Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011) . Our goal here was to show how the hippocampal system can be understood in terms of its place within the PRN, wherein it occupies a particular position both conceptually and structurally. Our assumption is that many of the fundamental principles of operation found in the classical "ventral stream" can be extended to the MTL, up to and including the hippocampus. This follows directly from the view that all the structures in this hierarchy are engaged in both perception and memory. A key question in thinking about the hippocampus in this framework concerns the unique features of the hippocampus, and how they relate to its special role in representing space and episodes. Ever since the report on H.M., studies of amnesia have been central to ideas about hippocampal function. Recent work has highlighted two aspects of the amnesia resulting from damage to the hippocampus: First, there is a severe impairment in the ability to construct and represent complex spatial scenes (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007) ; second, there is a loss of highly specific details about episodes and spatial layouts (e.g., Hirshhorn, Newman, & Moscovitch, 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2000) . What is the connection between these findings, and how do they relate to episodes and cognitive maps?
Our attempt to answer these questions has led us to approach memory, and the hippocampal role in it, from a new perspective. This perspective emphasizes continuous, dynamic interactions throughout the PRN, involving both feed-forward and feedback mechanisms within and between so-called memorial and perceptual systems (cf. Barense et al., 2012; Damasio, 1989; Peterson, Cacciamani, Barense, & Scalf, 2012 ; see also Henson & Gagnepain, 2010; Meyer & Damasio, 2009 , for views that focus on dynamic loops in memory). It requires a shift from thinking about these brain regions as being organized for the purpose of memory or perception per se toward the view that they are instead organized to represent states of the world. It suggests that most parts of this hierarchy, from the bottom to the top, play a role in both perceptual and memorial processes and that principles already well studied and understood for classic perceptual phenomena might provide important clues to how memory works. We lay the groundwork for this representational approach by considering an aspect of neural information processing not often at the center of discussions about memory or perception.
Patterns Everywhere
Patterns of neural activity, in both space and time, drive the formation and use of mental representations. Patterns are the currency of neural function, in that brains both generate and recognize them. In the generative mode, patterns are important in several distinct ways. For one, they play a crucial role in brain development (e.g., Shatz, 1996; Sur, Angelucci, & Sharma, 1999) . Such patterned activity, frequently generated spontaneously within the system, but also sometimes initiated by inputs from outside the system, seems to be essential in guaranteeing that brains develop as they should-for example that sensory systems acquire the structure needed to properly inform the brain about the state of the external world (and here the term external applies to everything outside the brain, including other parts of the body). In addition to this special role in development, pattern generation is crucial This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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2 throughout life as organisms generate patterns that form "predictions" and that provide the input to action systems underlying behavior in the world. Brains also regularly engage in pattern recognition. Inputs from the world, in the form of patterned neural activity, provide the critical foundation for everything the brain does, including perception and memory. This core function of pattern recognition comes with certain inherent problems. The brain must overcome noisy, corrupted, and partial inputs if it is to recognize an input pattern as the same as one experienced before. Hence, the ability to "pattern complete" in the face of corrupt data is an essential organizing principle of the brain. It is highly likely that this capability exists at every level of the nervous system, because the problem of variable and/or partial inputs must exist throughout the system. Successful pattern completion at a given level could be the source of "familiarity" signals from that level. Figure 1 shows that pattern completion can overcome minor departures from predicted patterns, allowing the system to essentially ignore the variation associated with noise and incomplete data. However, when the departure from prediction exceeds some threshold something different happens-instead of pattern completing, and generating a familiarity signal, the system detects "novelty." Novelty detection is a function that logically depends on the presence of representations that can generate predictions whose confirmation results in a familiarity signal, and whose disconfirmation signals the presence of something unexpected, or new. Our approach asserts that novelty and familiarity detection mechanisms exist at every level of the representational system, where novelty is defined in terms of the features and relations each representational level codes for.
At each level of the system, there is some existing representation that can be thought of as a "whole," generated by inputs from a collection of "parts" at a lower level. Given that pattern completion processes play out at every level of the brain, what serves as a "whole" at one level serves as a "part" at another. Representations at the "bottom" of the hierarchy are about "features" of the world-we assume these are to be defined at a relatively primitive level, for example, edges, or shapes, or sound fragments. As one ascends the hierarchy, representations are about things like parts, objects, places, scenes, actors, and actions. At the "top" of this particular hierarchy, the representations are conjunctions of these elements (objects, places, actors, actions) that take the form of O' Keefe and Nadel's (1978) "cognitive maps." The presence of feed-forward and feedback connections means that each level of the hierarchy "talks to" levels both above and below it, in some cases several levels away. This dynamic interaction among multiple levels, from high to low, is the central pillar of our framework. Such dynamical frameworks have been proposed for perception, and below we use examples from object perception to illustrate these ideas. After that, we apply the approach to memory, with the goal of showing that the same framework can apply to what have been previously treated as quite distinct parts of the temporal lobe.
To summarize, we propose that the hippocampus is part of a representational network, each level of which is connected with others below and above it. Feed-forward and feedback mechanisms are at play at every level, allowing for pattern completion processes that can generate the detection of either familiarity or novelty. We suggest that basic whole-part interactions occur between all levels, much as has been noted by others (e.g., Grossberg, 1987) . We can now proceed to a discussion of how perception and memory depend on these kinds of networks.
Interactive Effects in Perception: Feed-Forward and Feedback Connections
Visual perception in general, and part-whole relationships within objects in particular, have frequently been explained with fully feed-forward models (e.g., Marr, 1982; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Serre, Kreiman, et al., 2007; Serre, Oliva, & Poggio, 2007) . Such models are appealing because the stimuli that best activate neurons increase in complexity as one ascends the visual hierarchy (e.g., Hubel & Weisel, 1959) , as does the size of the classic receptive fields of neurons in these areas (i.e., the region of the retina that affects a neuron's response in an otherwise empty visual field). However, demonstrations that context modulates the responses of neurons at the earliest levels of the visual hierarchy (e.g., Kapadia, Ito, Gilbert, & Westheimer, 1995; Kapadia, Westheimer, & Gilbert, 2000; Lamme, 1995; Zhou, Friedman, & von der Heydt, 2000) call for explanation in terms of interactive processing, either within or between hierarchical levels. Whereas neurons certainly interact within a level (lateral inhibition is an excellent example), such "horizontal" communication between neurons is thought to be too slow to account for many of the observed contextual influences (Craft, Schutze, Niebur, & von der Heydt, 2007; Zhou et al., 2000 ; for counterarguments, see Zhaoping, 2005) . Because communication between vertically arranged levels of the hierarchy is much faster, accounts of visual perception involving feedback from higher to lower levels have been proposed. Some of these accounts (e.g., Craft et al., 2007) model feedback from levels only slightly higher in the hierarchy and assert that feedback from even higher levels would not arrive in time to influence the responses of lower level units. Others demonstrate that feedback from substantially higher brain regions can arrive in time to influence low-level activity (Bar et al., 2006; Bullier, 2001; Lamme, 1995;  T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003; cf. Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Dehaene et al., 1998) . This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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Feed-forward-feedback (FF-FB) models assume, as in Figure 1 , that representations at higher levels predict a certain pattern at lower levels and that the degree to which the input matches or mismatches the predicted pattern is detected (T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999) . Critically, FF-FB models predict that an initial response in the primary visual cortex (V1) based on only the local information within a cell's receptive field can be altered by feedback from higher levels representing global information that provides a better fit to the scene (e.g., Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Jehee, Lamme, & Roelfsema, 2007 ; T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003) . This is exactly what physiological experiments by T. S. Lee, Mumford, Romero, and Lamme (1998) showed: 40 -60 ms after stimulus onset, V1 neurons responded to local texture features, but 80 -200 ms after stimulus onset, their responses were driven by contextual information that was detected by higher level cells with larger receptive fields (for similar effects, see Lamme, 1995; Sugase, Yamane, Ueno, & Kawano, 1999) . More recently, using transcranial magnetic stimulation with human observers, Wokke, Vandenbroucke, Scholte, and Lamme (2013) found that activity critical for perceiving a subjective contour shape occurred later in V1 than in the lateral occipital cortex (LO), a higher level brain region with larger receptive fields that is known to respond to objects (cf. T. S. Lee & Nguyen, 2001 ). These results favor the view that the backward flow of information carried by feedback connections is critical for perception.
One focus of current research concerns identifying the role of feedback. There are two broad classes of models: predictive coding models and hierarchical Bayesian inference models. Rao and Ballard (1999) proposed that higher level representations make predictions regarding the current input, and these predictions are then matched against the features in lower level cells (as in Figure 1 ). On Rao and Ballard's "predictive coding" model, lower level features that are consistent with predictions made by higher level representations are suppressed (thereby saving energy by not representing information redundantly); only the mismatching features remain active as "error signals." Seemingly consistent with the predictive coding model, Murray, Kersten, Olshausen, Schrater, and Woods (2003) observed that activity increased in LO when observers were able to perceive four disconnected line segments as grouped into a diamond, whereas activity in V1 decreased.
Hierarchical Bayesian inference models offer an alternative interpretation for decreased activity at lower levels. These models propose that several interpretations are active simultaneously at multiple processing levels until the best fitting interpretation is found through an interactive competitive process whereby the best fitting interpretation is integrated across processing levels by suppressing features/details that are inconsistent with it (T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003) . In other words, hierarchical Bayesian inference models suggest that reduced activity indicates that the response to the best fitting interpretation has been sharpened (cf. Spratling, 2008 Spratling, , 2010 .
In a creative application of fMRI and multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA), Kok, Jehee, and de Lange (2012) tested these alternative models. They manipulated expectations in order to manipulate high-level prediction. fMRI revealed reduced responses in V1 when the input matched the observer's expectation. Having found the reduced activity in V1 predicted on both forms of FF-FB models, Kok et al. used MVPA to assess the representational content of the V1 responses. They reasoned that according to hierarchical Bayesian inference models, the presence of expected stimuli should be easily read out of the V1 responses because inconsistent features should be suppressed. According to predictive coding models, however, V1 responses would carry little information regarding the expected stimulus because consistent features would be suppressed. They found that pattern classification in V1 was accurate for expected stimuli but not for unexpected stimuli, consistent with the idea that responses to the expected stimuli were sharpened by suppression of irrelevant features, as predicted by hierarchical Bayesian inference models. Furthermore, V1 responses were reduced more for the unexpected stimulus than for the expected stimulus; very little suppression of responses to the expected stimulus was observed. In related behavioral research, Peterson and Skow (2008) and Salvagio, Cacciamani, and Peterson (2012) reported that candidate objects that lose the competition for border ownership in object perception are suppressed. These results support the claim that features consistent with interpretations that compete with the best fitting one are suppressed. Salvagio et al. showed that the location of the losing competitor was suppressed as well; their evidence suggests that location suppression extends to low levels in the visual hierarchy (cf. Likova & Tyler, 2008 , who found converging evidence using fMRI).
This section reviewed some of the evidence that feedback plays an essential role in perception. None of the evidence discussed so far extends the feedback story to regions traditionally considered part of a memory system. We next discuss research showing that novelty-detection mechanisms in the perirhinal cortex of the MTL play a role in object perception and that feedback from the perirhinal cortex alters responses in prestriate cortex (V2), bringing memory into the picture. These data extend the evidence for FF-FB processing loops to brain regions traditionally considered to be exclusively involved in explicit memory, taking us ever closer to the hippocampal system that is our ultimate focus.
Traditional Memory Areas Involved in Perception via FF-FB Interactions
As we noted at the outset, the medial temporal lobes have been thought by many to function exclusively in service of declarative memory (e.g., Squire, 2004) . Recent research showing that damage to the perirhinal cortex of the MTL impairs the discrimination of objects sharing many similar parts/features has led to the hypothesis that the perirhinal cortex contributes to perception when configurations, rather than individual features or parts, are required to solve the task (e.g., Barense et al., 2005; Barense, Gaffan, & Graham, 2007; Barense, Rogers, Bussey, Saksida, & Graham, 2010; Bartko, Winters, Cowell, Saksida, & Bussey, 2007; Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Murray & Richmond, 2001 ). Because working memory was involved in the tasks used to assess perception, however, it remained uncertain whether these results demanded a slight extension of perirhinal cortex function to include working memory or a more dramatic extension to include perception. Barense et al. (2012) showed that damage to the perirhinal cortex eliminated effects of object memories on a quintessentially perceptual phenomenon, object-ground assignment (i.e., the perception of an object on one side of a border and a shapeless ground on the other side). Peterson and her colleagues have demonstrated This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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previously that the presence of a portion of a real-world object on one side of a border is one of many cues used by the visual system to determine where an object lies with respect to a border. They showed that regions that portray portions of well-known objects are substantially and significantly more likely to be perceived as objects at a border they share with another region of the same size, than are matched regions comprising the same parts arranged into novel configurations; average differences are approximately 25% (Gibson & Peterson, 1994; Peterson et al., 2000; Peterson, Gerhardstein, Mennemeier, & Rapesak, 1998; Peterson, Harvey, & Weidenbacher, 1991 ; see Figures 2a and 2b ). Peterson and her colleagues refer to these effects as "familiar configuration" effects. Keep in mind that for these object-ground experiments, "familiar" means "well known," not "recently seen" (although see Peterson & Enns, 2005; Peterson & Lampignano, 2003) . Barense et al. found that perirhinal cortex-damaged individuals failed to show these effects of familiar configuration on object perception (see Figure  2c ). The failure of perirhinal cortex-damaged individuals to show effects of familiar configuration on object perception at a border occurred primarily because they perceived regions comprising familiar parts rearranged into novel configurations as objects more often than did control participants; they also perceived regions portraying familiar configurations as objects slightly less often than did control participants (see Figure 2d ). There are two ways to account for why perirhinal cortexdamaged individuals perceive regions comprising familiar parts rearranged into novel configurations as objects more often than control participants. One possibility, consistent with a feedforward architecture, is that when the perirhinal cortex is intact, the novelty response to the entire configuration in the perirhinal cortex dominates the system output. When the perirhinal cortex is damaged, this high-level response is unavailable to overrule lower level responses. On this view, low-level visual responses are normally overshadowed by the perirhinal cortex, but are not altered by feedback from it. Barense et al. (2012) proposed an alternative interpretation in which the perirhinal cortex interacts with lower level areas in the visual processing stream where the parts are represented and hence where familiarity versus novelty of the parts is determined. This allows the perirhinal cortex to detect the consistency of the familiarity/novelty response to the configuration as a whole and to the parts comprising that configuration. A similar form of interconnectivity is posited in the hierarchical Bayesian inference models discussed in the preceding section (T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003) . Barense et al. (2012) to test effects of familiar configuration on object perception at a border. The stimuli comprise two equal area regions separated by a central border. Each display had a critical region that was equally often black and white, and left and right of the central border. (Here, all critical regions are shown in black on the left of the central border.) A: The critical regions are familiar configurations in that they depict portions of well-known objects (a guitar, a standing woman, and a table lamp, from left to right). B: The critical regions are novel configurations formed by breaking the familiar configurations into parts at minima of curvature and spatially rearranging those parts such that the resulting configuration is novel. Thus, the novel configurations in the bottom row are composed of the same (familiar) parts as the familiar configurations in the top row. C: Effects of familiar configuration in two patients with medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage, including the perirhinal cortex (MTL1 and MTL2), age-matched control participants (Controls), and control participants with damage to the hippocampus of the MTL but without damage to the perirhinal cortex (HC controls). Effects of familiar configuration are measured as the difference between the percentage of reports that the familiar configurations and the part-rearranged novel configurations were perceived as objects at the border (%Fam Cofig  Fig Ϫ % PR Novel Fig) . The perirhinal cortex-damaged patients' performance was outside the range of the control participants' performance. D: The percentage of trials on which participants reported perceiving the object on the side of the central border where the critical region lay for displays with familiar configurations (black bars) and the part-rearranged novel configurations. It is clear that the reduced effects of familiar configuration shown in (C) are due to increased reports that the object lay on the side where the part-rearranged novel configurations lay as well as to reduced reports that the object lay on the familiar configuration side of the border. Fam ϭ Familiar; Config ϭ Configuration; Obj ϭ Object; PR ϭ Part-Rearranged. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Barense et al. proposed that when the intact perirhinal cortex detects a novel configuration composed of familiar parts, it sends inhibitory feedback that reduces familiarity responses in lower level brain regions representing the parts. Thus, lower level responses that are inconsistent with the best fitting high-level interpretation for a display are suppressed, as in hierarchical Bayesian inference models. On this alternative view, one does not normally observe familiarity effects on object perception at a border when familiar parts are present but arranged in a novel configuration because the low-level part familiarity responses are suppressed. In contrast, when both the configuration and the parts are familiar, the intact perirhinal cortex sends feedback that reinforces familiarity responses in lower level brain regions representing the familiarity of the parts. As a result, when both the configuration and the parts are familiar, familiarity can affect the determination of where an object lies with respect to a border at both high and low levels of the hierarchy. Barense et al. (2012) proposed that damage to the perirhinal cortex impairs the ability to detect and compare the familiarity of parts and wholes, and as a consequence removes both inhibitory and facilitatory feedback to lower level brain regions. As a result, object perception at the border is determined by part familiarity alone without amplification or reduction by feedback from the perirhinal cortex. Inasmuch as both the familiar configuration and the part-rearranged novel configuration are composed of the same familiar parts, one would expect that perirhinal cortex-damaged individuals would perceive the two types of regions as the object approximately equally often, and they did. Peterson et al. (2012) used fMRI to investigate whether lower level part familiarity responses were modulated by feedback from the perirhinal cortex, and hence to adjudicate between the FF view of perirhinal cortex function and the FF-FB view. In their experiment, nonbrain-damaged individuals viewed three types of configurations: (a) familiar configurations (depictions of real-world objects), (b) novel configurations composed of the same familiar parts arranged in different spatial relationships ("part-rearranged novel configurations"), and (c) control novel configurations composed of novel parts (see Figure 3a) , and reported whether each depicted a real-world or a novel object. The displays were altered such that all of these critical regions were perceived as objects at the border they shared with an adjacent region. On the basis of previous research (Barense, Henson, & Graham, 2011) , Peterson et al. expected to see greater activation in the perirhinal cortex for familiar configurations than for novel configurations. In addition, they expected to see a different response to the two types of novel configurations (those comprising novel parts and those comprising familiar parts) if the perirhinal cortex detects the familiarity/ novelty of both a configuration and its parts. The results supported these predictions: Perirhinal cortex responses were (a) larger for familiar configurations than for control novel configurations composed of novel parts and (b) smaller for novel configurations composed of familiar parts than for control novel configurations composed of novel parts (see Figure 3b) . These results supported Barense et al.'s (2012) proposal that the perirhinal cortex detects the conjunction versus disjunction of configuration and part familiarity. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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In order to search for evidence of the hypothesized feedback from the perirhinal cortex to lower level regions where part familiarity is represented, Peterson et al. (2012) examined responses in V2, where receptive fields match the size of the parts of their stimuli. (They had retinotopically mapped V2 before the experiment began.) They observed higher amplitude responses in V2 for the familiar parts when they were arranged in a familiar configuration rather than a novel configuration (these are context effects) (see Figure 3c) . Because the parts were identical locally (i.e., within the receptive fields of V2 cells) regardless of the configuration in which they were arranged, Peterson et al. took the presence of a differential response in V2 to the same parts as a function of the configuration in which they were arranged as evidence of feedback from a higher level brain region where the entire configuration was represented. The V2 amplitude difference was in the same direction as the response difference for the two types of configurations in the perirhinal cortex; hence, hypothesized that it was the likely source of the FB. At first glance, these results may seem inconsistent with Kok et al.'s (2012) results, discussed previously. However, the apparent inconsistency disappears if the reduced V2 response to familiar parts in part-rearranged novel configurations indexes the suppression of lower level "familiarity" responses that were not predicted by the higher level "novelty" response, thereby integrating the novelty interpretation across levels (cf. T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003) .
Although further research is needed to follow up on the results of the studies reviewed in this section, they are consistent with the view that representations of complex configurations in the perirhinal cortex can support perception, memory, or other tasks, as the organism's situation requires (cf. Bussey et al., 2002; Murray & Bussey, 1999) . What is important, in this view, is the nature of the information being represented, not the psychological function being assessed. When a certain kind of information is required, the perirhinal cortex plays a role, whether it is a task usually referred to as perception, working memory, or even long-term memory. Furthermore, although it has been known that the perirhinal cortex sends feedback to anterior ventral stream areas such as the anterior and posterior inferior temporal cortices (e.g., Higuchi & Miyashita, 1996; Lavenex & Amaral, 2000; Lavenex, Suzuki, & Amaral, 2002) , the studies reviewed in this section provide evidence that feedback from the perirhinal cortex has a functional effect on activity in the lower level visual area, V2, thereby extending evidence for FF-FB architectures to include high-level brain regions classically defined as memory regions (cf. Clavagnier, Falchier, & Kennedy, 2004) . Because the perirhinal cortex provides input to the hippocampus through the entorhinal cortex, and receives FB from the hippocampus, the studies in this section provide the link necessary to bring the hippocampus into the interactive posterior representational network.
Extending the Representational Framework to the Hippocampus
To extend our account into the heart of the MTL-the hippocampus-we have to return to the question of what the hippocampus is "representing." Within the representational hierarchy we are considering here, the hippocampus receives its direct inputs primarily from the entorhinal cortex, which itself receives inputs from the parahippocampal gyrus and the perirhinal cortex. The former is known to represent scenes from a particular perspective (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998) , whereas the latter represents objects (e.g., Barense et al., 2007; Burke et al., 2012) . These conclusions are supported by a number of recent neuroimaging studies (Harel, Kravitz, & Baker, 2013; Howard, Kumaran, Ólafsdóttir, & Spiers, 2011) , including studies demonstrating that each of these areas generates its own content-specific familiarity (or novelty) signals (Martin, McLean, O'Neil, & Kohler, in press ). The characteristics of cells in these areas (including head direction cells, border cells, and grid cells in the medial entorhinal cortex [Killian, Jutras, & Buffalo, 2012; Lever, Burton, Jeewajee, O'Keefe, & Burgess, 2009; Solstad, Boccara, Kropff, Moser, & Moser, 2008] , which collectively feed into place cells in the hippocampus [O'Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971; Zhang et al., 2013] ) strongly support the view that the hippocampus represents objects in places, in a global, view-invariant framework, a position first suggested in the cognitive map approach (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) that has been adopted by many others (e.g., King, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & O'Keefe, 2002) .
We have argued (Nadel, 2008) that the hippocampus represents "contexts" by using an ensemble of hippocampal neurons that have a very particular feature: They "talk" to the precise extrahippocampal neurons that themselves represent the parts of that context, that is, the objects and scene elements. Some have argued that the hippocampus provides an "index" to these extrahippocampal representations (e.g., Teyler & DiScenna, 1986; Teyler & Rudy, 2007) , which would allow it to activate the parts, but we believe matters are more complicated than that. In addition to this indexing function, we argue that the hippocampus provides a critical component, namely, it frames the spatial relations among the various parts of the environment-this is what we mean by the notion of a scaffold. A particular combination of parts, and their spatial relations, defines a unique context. Hence, the representation of a context necessarily involves interactions between multiple levels of representation, one capturing the spatial frame (the whole) and the others capturing the pieces and patches that populate that frame (the parts).
The hippocampal function we envision here fits squarely within our dynamic whole-part framework. The hippocampal representation of a spatial layout or of an episode is a "whole," composed of all the "parts" that it links to (or indexes) by way of long-range feedback connections to the extra-hippocampal regions representing those parts. This characterization provides a way of talking about the role we know the hippocampus plays in the retrieval of recent and even remote episodic memories. It provides a direct link between hippocampal involvement and the amount of detailed knowledge one retrieves. In support of these ideas, Staresina, Henson, Kriegeskorte, and Alink (2012) showed that successful retrieval of recently learned associations between words and scenes was reflected in increased similarity in activation patterns in the parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) between encoding and retrieval. Critically, this increase in similarity at the level of the PHG was linked to hippocampal activation. Greater similarity in PHG (and hence better recall) was associated with increased hippocampal activity. The authors take their data to support the view that the hippocampus drives pattern completion in the PHG.
Our view of the special nature of episodic memory can account for two central results of damage to the episodic system: (a) the inability to encode or even construct spatial contexts, and to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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conditionalize what is learned to specific contexts, and (b) the loss of the ability to encode and retrieve the parts of an episode. The role of the hippocampal system in representing episodic context was suggested by O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) , and expanded upon by Nadel and Willner (1980; see Nadel, 2008 , for a recent update). The results of many studies have confirmed that damage to the hippocampal system interferes with context coding. As noted at the outset, the special role of this system in encoding and retrieving episodic details has become clear in recent years (Hirshhorn et al., 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2000) . In the present framework, we would say that amnesics lack the "whole"-the cognitive map representation-that is the only brain mechanism capable of retrieving all (or most) of the parts (the details) associated with that whole. In a similar fashion, patients with perirhinal cortex damage lack the representation that allows them to detect the familiarity versus novelty of the whole object and its relationship to the familiarity versus novelty of the object's parts Peterson et al., 2012) . It is worth noting that damage to the hippocampus alone does not produce the pattern of deficits observed when the perirhinal cortex is also damaged, as is the case in some amnesic patients: Barense et al. (2012) tested amnesic subjects with MTL damage that did not extend to the perirhinal cortex; they showed the same pattern of object-ground performance as control participants without brain damage (see Figure 2) . Our approach demands that most levels of the representational system play a role in both perceptual and memorial functions related to their kind of representation. This raises the question of a potential role for the hippocampus in what might be called a "perceptual" function. If this system, so critical for representing global environmental features, were involved in perception, what would it be the perception of?
Recent work from Barense, Graham, Lee, and their colleagues has addressed this question in both imaging studies and in work with amnesic patients suffering from hippocampal damage (e.g., Barense, Henson, Lee, & Graham, 2010; A. C. Lee, Brodersen, & Rudebeck, 2013; A. C. Lee et al., 2005; A. C. Lee, Yeung, & Barense, 2012) . These studies used highly similar complex scene stimuli that varied from one another solely in terms of the spatial relations among the parts of the depicted scenes. Hippocampal lesions impaired perceptual discrimination between these highly similar stimuli (A. C. Lee et al., 2012) , and the imaging results suggested that the hippocampus represents the parts of the whole scene in a view-invariant abstract representation. This contrasts with the parahippocampal cortex, which as we have noted represents scenes from a particular perspective (e.g., Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Hayes, Nadel, & Ryan, 2007) . These data are consistent with the notion that the hippocampus is central to constructing and representing complex spaces, as Maguire and her colleagues have argued in a number of recent articles (e.g., Bonnici, Kumaran, et al., 2012; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Mullaly, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2012) . This idea brings the hippocampus into line with the perirhinal cortex, in that it appears the perirhinal cortex may do more or less the same thing, but for complex objects rather than scenes (A. C. Lee et al., 2005) .
Although we are emphasizing the ways in which the hippocampus behaves much like its neighbors in the MTL in terms of its dependence on feed-forward and feedback loops, there are some unique features to the hippocampus. In our view, this reflects the fact that every episode is a singularity, happening in a specific place, at a particular time. Indeed, it is the ability to refer a particular event to a unique context that renders episodic memory such a powerful tool. How does the brain represent, and ultimately retrieve, singular events? We noted above that the representational systems in the PRN are relatively tolerant of minor variations between predictions and reality. That is, pattern completion mechanisms ignore what is different between an existing representation and a new input-apples are apples and oranges are oranges. The pattern completion processes that give rise to the representations serving such generalizations are not well suited to dealing with singularities. Here, what is unique about a given pattern of inputs is precisely what must be preserved. One episode can only be distinguished from another similar episode by retaining the features that separate the one from the other. Herein lies a clue to the loss of specific details after hippocampal damage.
Distinguishing episodes, and contexts, on the basis of differences in detail calls for a process other than pattern completion, one that emphasizes differences rather than similarities. Pattern separation allows the creation of representations that discriminate one input pattern from another. Much as all neural systems must accomplish pattern completion, it seems likely that all systems must also accomplish pattern separation, although the nature of what is being represented will determine how such separation is accomplished in each case. Although most neural systems can presumably separate widely different input patterns, there appears to be a relatively unique solution within the hippocampal system that allows it to separate very similar high-dimensional patterns from one another (Bakker, Kirwan, Miller, & Stark, 2008; Leutgeb, Leutgeb, Moser, & Moser, 2007) , and as a result to preserve access to the "details" that distinguish one spatial layout, or one episodic memory, from any others that might share many features. This function of separating similar high-dimensional patterns from one another depends on the dentate gyrus, working in concert with the field CA3 of the hippocampus proper. Research on this capacity has been quite voluminous in recent years, and is well beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, important to point out that this capacity seems to depend on the now wellestablished phenomenon of neurogenesis in the dentate gyrusthat is, the birth of new neurons throughout life. When this capacity is impaired, pattern separation suffers, and animals (including humans) fail to reliably distinguish one episodic context from another (Clelland et al., 2009) .
As noted earlier, every representational level can generate "novelty" signals relevant to the nature of the representations formed at that level. When the hippocampus detects novelty, this is frequently accompanied by species-typical forms of behavioral exploration, which allow the organism to update its representation of the environment, incorporating new features, or the absence of old features. However, sometimes the extent of novelty is such that the only conclusion the organism can draw is that this is a new context. This is where pattern separation rather than pattern completion comes into play. In such cases, instead of updating an old representation, the system creates a new one. This particular dynamic has been extensively studied in rats, where a distinction has been drawn between minor changes that lead to updating (and what is known as "rate remapping" in the collection of cells representing the context), or to the creation of a new map (and what is known as "global remapping"-where the collection of cells take on completely different roles; see Nadel, 2008 , for a more extended This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
8 NADEL AND PETERSON discussion of these issues). One can see in this function just how the system acquires the ability to represent the details that characterize singular episodes. This ability carries with it a greater sensitivity to variation-the more detailed the "prediction" a system generates, the greater the possibility that something different will be detected. Such a context-sensitive, detail-oriented system has both benefits and costs. The main benefits include the following: (a) Facts about the world can be conditionalized such that they apply in some contexts but not in others; (b) physical and social environments can be represented with increased precision. Perhaps the most noticeable cost relates to capacity-such a system is capable of representing in considerable detail every episode in an organism's life. We have recently argued this cost is overcome by a powerful forgetting mechanism that clears away many of the episodes and details that would otherwise saturate the system (Hardt, Nader, & Nadel, 2013 ). As we learn more about the cellular and network-level mechanisms that underlie these processes, we will increase our understanding of the ways in which the hippocampus is both similar to, and different from, the other levels of the representational hierarchy of which it is a part.
Some Questions
A first question is whether the relevant brain networks in the PRN are connected to each other in ways that would permit the kind of multilevel dynamical interactions we are proposing. What in fact do we know about how the parts of the PRN are linked to each other?
A recent review by Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, and Mishkin (2013) provides an answer and suggests an approach to the ventral visual pathway's role in object perception that is very close to ours. Kravitz et al. show that each level of this representational hierarchy is engaged in two-way communication with one or more other levels. Thus, loops exist all the way from V1 to the anterior temporal lobe, but what about beyond that, into the MTL regions typically associated with memory function? Kravitz et al. extend their story as far as the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices, noting that they connect reciprocally with areas TE and TF. Taking the next step, it has been argued that within the MTL itself, there are extensive reciprocal interactions (Aggleton, 2012; Lavenex & Amaral, 2000) . Thus, there is every reason to believe that an approach requiring extensive bidirectional, dynamical interactions is at least biologically plausible, if not actually demanded by the anatomy.
What is the advantage of thinking about MTL function in this way? One answer is that it is going to take some version of a multilevel theory to account for everything we know about this brain region, so the complexity of the approach should not count against it. A more telling answer would point out some of the interesting questions and experiments this framework suggests.
One such question follows from our assumption that psychological entities such as objects, scenes, and contexts require the engagement of multiple levels of the hierarchy. For example, we know that the perirhinal cortex represents objects in some way. How does this differ from the way in which objects are represented in earlier ventral stream areas such as inferotemporal cortex?
Another question concerns the phenomenon of interlevel suppression observed in object perception, and what it tells us about "whole-part" relations. Does this kind of interaction between levels play out in the same way at all levels of the posterior representational network? For example, what is the result of interactions between the hippocampal "whole" and the "parts" of which it is composed? Does the activation of a particular cognitive map, or episodic memory, lead to suppression in the representation of similar maps or memories that might have been activated, but are not? One possible answer to this question comes out of a consideration of the mechanisms underlying hippocampal representations. Many have argued that the hippocampal CA3 field implements "attractor dynamics" internally (Guzowski, Knierim, & Moser, 2004; Tsodyks, 1999; Wills, Lever, Cacucci, Burgess, & O'Keefe, 2005) . Activation of one representation precludes activation of the various alternative representations that the presence of some of the same parts (objects in this case) might have suggested. Does this lead to suppression of the familiarity response to the parts that favor the alternative interpretation, as predicted by our interactive view of the PRN? Or does it just lead to suppression of the representation of particular (spatial or temporal) relations between the parts captured by the hippocampus?
Evidence about these kinds of questions with regard to the hippocampus might be most easily gathered in studies of "remapping" in rats, already referred to above. Recently, Jezek, Henriksen, Treves, Moser, and Moser (2011) reported results from a paradigm that confronts rats with instantaneous context shifts. They observed a period of "flickering" between context representations before the system settles into the current context representation. Just as one cannot simultaneously see both interpretations of ambiguous objects, such as the face-vase stimulus, rats (and humans we presume) cannot simultaneously experience two contexts-the elevation of one implies the inhibition of the other. Recent demonstrations of specific context coding in human MTL, using multivoxel analyses, raise the possibility of studying similar dynamics in humans. Once sufficiently realistic instantaneous context shifts are designed for humans in a scanner, this study could be done.
Finally, our approach assumes that what a given level "represents" should vary over time. This follows from the fact that an initial fast-forward sweep of activation will only activate partial representations. The whole ensemble that results from iterative dynamics will only emerge later. As these differences should play out on a scale of tens and even hundreds of milliseconds, they ought to be detectable using various neuroimaging methods, as well as with standard primate neurophysiological techniques. As discussed earlier, such effects have been reported in several parts of the ventral stream. Our approach predicts similar results in the MTL, reflecting both the global (whole) and local (part) roles that distinct levels play, and reflecting the determinative role played by feedback.
Conclusions
The hippocampus is just the last in a set of mostly posterior brain systems organized in a rather similar way to represent the world as we experience it in all its sensory richness, and as we come to interpret and understand it from experiencing its statistical regularities in time and space. These representational systems, so useful for predicting possible futures, share common design features such as pattern completion and pattern separation. PsychoThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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THE HIPPOCAMPUS logical functions such as perception, attention, and memory (of various kinds) are not neatly attached to any single level of representation. What is key is the nature of what is being represented, and the fact that the content of all representations results from a dynamical set of feed-forward-feedback interactions that instantiate systematic part-whole integrations. The hippocampus obeys the same rules as the other levels, but it seems to differ in two important ways from the other parts of this representational hierarchy: (a) It is at the top; hence, there is no greater "whole" of which it is but a part, at least not within this particular hierarchy. (It seems likely that a different story will emerge when one is thinking about evaluation and decisionmaking processes and any hippocampal role in them; see Aggleton, 2012.); (b) it manifests a specialized pattern separation system that is considerably more robust than similar systems seen at other levels of this hierarchy. Hence, it has the capability to represent singular episodes and to distinguish highly similar ones from each other. This ability, however, depends critically on the dynamic interactions between the hippocampus and its neighbors. The former captures the whole, whereas the latter fill in the parts comprising that whole.
